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________________ 
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________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
Mukeshkumar Patel brought suit against his former business partner Vithalbhai 
Dhaduk for breach of contract related to a Memorandum of Understanding they signed at 
the conclusion of their business relationship.  Dhaduk filed a counterclaim for tortious 
interference related to a personal loan provided through one of Patel’s affiliated companies.  
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the orders of the court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Patel’s breach of contract claim and dismissing Dhaduk’s 
counterclaim. 
I 
 Patel and Dhaduk were friends and business partners for several years.  On July 16, 
2015, however, the two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) in order 
to “conclude [their] business relationship” and “conclude the entire business venture.”  
They decided to separate their joint ventures, including the companies Somahlution 
(“Soma”) and GPA.  The MOU had two provisions related to Soma and GPA: 
2). Dr. Dhaduk keeps Soma/GPA/Nuron (loss or profit). 
3). Dr. Dhaduk will pay Mukesh bhai[1] USD 9.45 Million as soon as he can 
for exiting Soma/GPA. 
Although the MOU does not state the source of the funds for the $9.45 million payment, 
Dhaduk maintains the parties agreed the payout will only come from the profits of Soma 
 




and GPA.  Since signing the MOU, Dhaduk has invested an additional $30 million into 
Soma but has not paid Patel. 
Prior to the dissolution of their business relationship, Dhaduk gave Patel “a personal 
loan of $1.1 million dollars to come through” a corporation named NKD, and “NKD 
executed a promissory note in that regard.”  Dhaduk alleges NKD is “one of Mr. Patel’s 
affiliated companies.”  Patel allegedly directed NKD to not repay the loan on the grounds 
that it was covered by the MOU.  NKD has not paid Dhaduk. 
 Patel filed a complaint on December 6, 2017 alleging Dhaduk breached the MOU 
by not paying him the $9.45 million.  After filing an answer and affirmative defenses in 
response to an amended complaint, Dhaduk filed an amended answer with counterclaims.  
After the court dismissed his counterclaims, Dhaduk filed an amended tortious interference 
counterclaim tied to the NKD loan.  The court dismissed that claim on November 6, 2019.  
Meanwhile, Patel moved for summary judgment on the contract claim.  On December 2, 
2019, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Patel after finding that the contract 
was unambiguous.  This appeal followed.  
II2  
 Dhaduk contends summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was improper 
because the MOU term “as soon as he can” is ambiguous and he should be allowed to 
 
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s order granting summary judgment is 
plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  




introduce parol evidence to allow a jury to interpret the term.  Under Pennsylvania contract 
law, if a term is ambiguous then parol evidence is permitted.  If the parol evidence 
demonstrates there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the interpretation of the 
term, then summary judgment is improper.   
Whether a term in an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law that courts can 
determine.  In re Somerset Reg’l Water Res., LLC, 949 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 2020).  A 
contract term “is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and 
capable of being understood in more than one sense.”  Id.  This ambiguity can be patent or 
latent.  A patent ambiguity is one that is apparent on the face of the document, and a latent 
ambiguity is “created by extrinsic or collateral circumstances.” Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 
1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004).  
As this is a diversity case governed by Pennsylvania law, we look to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for guidance in determining whether the term is ambiguous.  
When there is no state supreme court precedent, “we must predict how that court would 
resolve the issue.”  Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2006).  In our 
analysis, “an intermediate appellate state court . . . is a datum for ascertaining state law 
which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive 
data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.”  Comm’r v. Bosch’s Estate, 
387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (alteration in original). 
 
fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to 




With no Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on point,3 we turn to intermediate 
appellate state courts for guidance.  In Wilker v. Jenkins, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
reviewed a contract in which the debtor was “Due to pay as fast as I can.”  88 Pa. Super. 
177, 178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1926).  The court reflected favorably on a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision upholding a contract to “pay as soon as the crop can be sold or the money raised 
from any other source” because “it could not have been the intention of the parties that if 
the crop was destroyed . . . and the defendants could not procure the money from any other 
source, the debt should never be paid.”  Id. at 179 (quoting Nunez v. Dautel, 86 U.S. 560 
(1873)).  The Superior Court concluded that the term “allow[ed] the payor a reasonable 
time within which to make payment or acquire the means so to do, but that this time shall 
not be so extended as to defeat the purpose of the contract and enable the debtor to wholly 
avoid his obligation.”  Id. at 181.  The Superior Court further held that when parties agree 
that the time for repayment is conditioned on “the happening of a future event”—including 
the future event of a party becoming able to pay a sum of money—and that “event does not 
occur, the law will imply that the undertaking was to pay the debt and to do that within a 
reasonable time.”  Id. at 181–82. 
 
3  Cases featuring similar “pay when able” terms have reached the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, but the opinions focus on whether this language can toll a statute of limitations, 
e.g., In re Maniatakis’ Estate, 101 A. 920 (Pa. 1917), and in what circumstances similar 
language can become so abstract that there is no contract, e.g., Nelson v. Von 
Bonnhorst, 29 Pa. 352, 355 (1857) (holding an agreement to pay “whenever, in my 
opinion, my circumstances will enable me to do so” was not enforceable).  Neither of 




 Despite that general rule, there are circumstances under Pennsylvania law where 
courts should not require payment if the triggering condition has not been met.  In a 
decision later affirmed by the Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas noted the 
different interpretations of a “pay when able” clause,4 then concluded it did “not subscribe 
to either view as necessarily controlling here, but rather look[ed] to the intention of the 
parties as determined from their entire course of conduct.”  Novello v. Med. Elecs. & 
Research Corp., 60 Pa. D. & C. 2d 355, 357 (C.P. 1971), aff’d per curiam, 223 Pa. Super. 
736 (1972).  In Novello, an individual who was an “officer, treasurer, a director, accountant 
and a 10-percent shareholder” brought suit for unpaid salary where the corporation agreed 
compensation would be “subject to the availability of funds.”  Id. at 356.  The court noted 
plaintiff was involved in a “speculative venture” where it was reasonable to put off 
compensation to seek a “large future return” and the board of directors repeatedly put off 
the payment of salaries.  Id. at 358.  This, along with testimony from another employee, 
demonstrated the intention of the parties that no salaries would be paid until the company 
became profitable.  Id. at 360. 
 Wilker, the Pennsylvania Superior Court case, provides the better framework for 
this case.  The parties manifested an intent for Dhaduk to pay Patel in exchange for Patel 
exiting Soma and GPA.  While repayment is tied to Dhaduk’s future ability to pay, “time 
shall not be so extended as to defeat the purpose of the contract and enable the debtor to 
 
4  The majority view interprets “pay when able” to mean payment depends on whether 
the debtor actually has the ability to pay, while the minority view interprets “pay 
when able” to mean within a reasonable amount of time.  14 Williston on Contracts 




wholly avoid his obligation.”  Wilker, 88 Pa. Super. at 181.  Unlike Novello, exiting a 
company in exchange for a payout is not a “speculative venture” and the agreement was 
not part of a series of agreements setting forth conditions on payment.  As a result, we 
believe Pennsylvania courts would find this language to unambiguously mean that Dhaduk 
has a “reasonable time within which to make payment or acquire the means so to do.”  Id.  
Here, five and a half years have passed since the MOU was signed.  While this is not as 
long as the six years in Wilker, we conclude five and a half years has been a reasonable 
amount of time for the payment of this debt—especially since Dhaduk has given no 
indication that he has any plan to acquire the funds within any discernable timeframe. 
 Dhaduk contends “as soon as he can” is patently ambiguous because it is not clear 
the steps a debtor must take to pay the debt—must the debtor take money out of his 
retirement account, empty his bank account, or take out a payday loan?  Dhaduk seeks to 
bolster this argument by noting there is a majority and minority rule for interpreting “pay 
when able” provisions in contracts.5  Given the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruling in 
Wilker, however, we reject Dhaduk’s patent ambiguity argument and conclude the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is likely to conclude “pay when able” is unambiguous and 
requires payment within a reasonable amount of time. 
In the alternative, Dhaduk contends “as soon as he can” is latently ambiguous 
because Patel testified that he believed Dhaduk had “sufficient resources” to make the 
$9.45 million payment and Dhaduk’s obligation to make the payment would take at least a 
 




year to ripen.  This allegedly demonstrates Patel believed the obligation would be triggered 
by something other than Dhaduk being able to pay.  But Dhaduk being able to pay but 
having at least a year before the obligation ripens would be consistent with a requirement 
that the $9.45 million be paid within a reasonable amount of time.  Accordingly, Patel’s 
testimony does not create a latent ambiguity.  
Dhaduk also contends he should be able to introduce parol evidence that he and 
Patel agreed payment would only be made if Soma and GPA became profitable.  Dhaduk’s 
proposed interpretation would rewrite the contract, not merely interpret a term.  By hinging 
Dhaduk’s obligation to pay Patel on Soma and GPA’s success, Dhaduk would have us add 
a term to the contract.  Parol evidence, however, cannot be used to add or subtract terms 
from a contract.  Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Est. Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 
F.2d 1399, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he writing constitutes the agreement between the 
parties, and its terms cannot be added to nor subtracted from by parol evidence.” (quoting 
Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 126 A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924)).  Moreover, Dhaduk’s suggested 
term would burden Patel with the risks associated with Soma and GPA experiencing profit 
or loss.  This would stand in direct contravention of MOU Paragraph 2, which states “Dr. 
Dhaduk keeps Soma/GPA/Nuron (loss or profit).”   
 Additionally, to the extent Dhaduk asks us to enforce an alleged oral agreement he 
and Patel made before entering into the MOU, we decline to do so.  Dhaduk alleges that 
prior to executing the MOU he and Patel had an oral understanding that Dhaduk would 
make the payment when Soma and GPA started generating profits.  However, “[i]n cases 




concerning a subject which is dealt with in a written contract it is presumed that the writing 
was intended to set forth the entire agreement as to that particular subject.”  Mellon Bank 
Corp., 951 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Gianni, 126 A. at 792).  In the present case, Dhaduk and 
Patel created a fully integrated agreement, which specifically states, “We will have no other 
financial or managerial liability except the commitments made in this agreement.”  Dhaduk 
may not introduce evidence of a prior oral agreement that would modify the terms of Patel’s 
buyout.  See id. at 1407–08. 
III6 
We now consider the court’s dismissal of Dhaduk’s tortious interference claim.  As 
a preliminary matter, Patel contends we lack jurisdiction because Dhaduk did not specify 
the court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) order in his notice of appeal.  This argument is 
unavailing.  “[D]ecisions on the merits are not to be avoided on grounds of technical 
violations of procedural rules, and we have read notices of appeal liberally.”  Polonski v. 
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998).  We “exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over orders that are not specified in the notice of appeal where: (1) there is a 
connection between the specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the 
 
6  In analyzing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept as true the well-pleaded facts of 
the counterclaim and disregard legal conclusions.  Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 
341, 351 (3d Cir. 2016).  Additionally, we “construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. 
v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 




unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full 
opportunity to brief the issues.”  Id. 
First the two orders are related—the 12(b)(6) order was interlocutory and merged 
with the final judgment order that settled all outstanding claims in the case.  See In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders (to the 
extent that they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the final 
order.”).  Second, the intent to appeal the 12(b)(6) order is apparent from Dhaduk’s opening 
brief.  See Weimer v. Cty. of Fayette, 972 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[I]ntent to appeal 
. . . is clear from her opening brief.”).  Third, there was no prejudice as both parties fully 
briefed the issue.  See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (“[T]here is no prejudice since both parties 
have fully briefed the issues.”).  Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and will address the merits of this issue. 
Dhaduk alleges that Patel is liable for tortious interference of contract because he 
directed NKD to breach its obligation to repay a $1.1 million loan Dhaduk made to Patel 
through NKD.  Under Pennsylvania law, a claim for tortious interference of contract 
requires plaintiff to establish the following elements: 
(1) the existence of a contractual, or prospective contractual relation between 
the complainant and a third party;  
(2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, specifically intended to 
harm the existing relation, or to prevent a prospective relation from 
occurring;  
(3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and 





CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Crivelli v. General Motors Corp., 215 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 2000).  We 
need only address the first element, because although Dhaduk’s description of Patel’s 
relationship with NKD is unclear, by any reasonable reading of the counterclaim, Patel was 
not acting as a third party.  See Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ. Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 
507–08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“By definition, this cause of action requires three separate 
parties; parties to a contract . . . cannot assert this cause of action against each other.”).   
A. 
If Patel was the owner of NKD, then he was not a third party.  It appears that by 
describing NKD as one of Patel’s “affiliated” companies, Dhaduk is alleging Patel is the 
owner of NKD.  While corporate parents not protecting a “legitimate concern” can interfere 
with their subsidiaries’ contracts, Shared Commc’ns Servs. of 1800-80 JFK Blvd. Inc. v. 
Bell Atl. Properties Inc., 692 A.2d 570, 575 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), at least one Pennsylvania 
court has held an owner of a corporation cannot interfere with that corporation’s contracts, 
Levin v. Shiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C. 4th 152, 2001 WL 1807922, at *9 (C.P. 2001) (“[T]he 
tortious interference claim in Count II cannot be maintained . . . because [Defendant] is a 
50% shareholder of [the corporation] and would thus be a party to the contract with the 
District.”).  Accordingly, as the owner of NKD, Patel was a party to the $1.1 million loan 
and not a third person as required for a tortious interference claim. 
B. 
 Alternatively, if Patel was a corporate officer or employee of NKD, he was still not 




or agents for the corporation act within the scope of their employment or agency, the 
employees, the agents and the corporation are one and the same; there is no third party.”  
Rutherfoord, 612 A.2d at 508.  A corporate officer or employee is within the scope of their 
employment “unless the individual’s sole motive in causing the corporation to breach a 
contract is actual malice directed toward the plaintiff, or the individual’s conduct is against 
the interest of the corporation.”  Avins v. Moll, 610 F. Supp. 308, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1984) 
(citing Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974)).7  While we do not look for 
“magic words” like “sole” and “malice,” the counterclaimant must plead facts that would 
allow us to conclude that the counterclaim can survive a motion to dismiss. 
  Dhaduk’s counterclaim fails to demonstrate either that Patel’s sole motive was 
malice or that the direction not to repay the loan was against NKD’s interest.  Dhaduk 
contends Patel acted “in retaliation for Dr. Dhaduk informing Mr. Patel that . . . he could 
not be paid.”  Even reading this in the light most favorable to Dhaduk, there is no indication 
that this was done solely to harm Dhaduk and not to recover some of the $9.45 million 
Dhaduk owes Patel.   
Alternatively, Dhaduk contends the action “was against NKD’s interest, as NKD is 
now subject to legal action on the loan.”  However, we know of no legal proceeding against 
NKD even though three years have passed since Patel directed NKD not to repay the loan.  
Furthermore, as the court noted, “the possibility of litigation does not rise to the level of 
 
7  Despite Dhaduk’s attempts to characterize the rule regarding employees and officers as 
an exception to an exception that he need not plead, this is a vital requirement to show 




acting against NKD’s corporate interest, as the prospect of legal action does not necessarily 
translate to liability” and “Dhaduk has not alleged that the loan was subject to interest, 
penalties, or fees.”  These latter omissions are particularly noteworthy because, as a party 
to the loan agreement, Dhaduk is privy to whether or not these terms were part of the loan.8  
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the court’s orders granting summary 
judgment on the breach of contract claim and dismissing the tortious interference 
counterclaim. 
 
8  Dhaduk also seems to suggest Patel may be neither the owner nor an officer or 
employee of NKD.  Instead, “he may simply be good at manipulating others through 
misrepresentations.”  However, we do not believe it would be reasonable to read the 
phrase “Patel’s affiliated companies” to mean Patel is a complete outsider to NKD. 
